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1 Introduction
Market liquidity can evaporate in turbulent trading conditions, a phenom-
enon referred to as a “liquidity black hole” by Taleb (1997) and Persaud
(2003). Sharp drops in liquidity associated with discontinuous rises in price
impact create market stress and undermine investor confidence.1 Negative
sentiment can spread across financial markets, and what starts as an asset-
specific crisis may end up having very costly systemic repercussions; see
Borio (2000) and Cifuentes et al. (2004). In that regard, Morris and Shin
(2004) show that net selling pressure can arise endogenously from the strate-
gic interaction of long- and short-horizon traders. When the latter have
privately-known liquidity constraints, these authors locate a unique trigger
point at which a liquidity black hole emerges, and produce V-shaped price
reversals consistent with Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) and Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003). Understanding the onset of such catastrophic events
is important for financial practitioners and policymakers alike.
In this paper I study the potential for high-frequency market stress and/or
turbulence in the absence of information asymmetries or fundamental news.
Specifically, market participants’ asset demand is generated by two feedback
rules at high frequency. First, according to positive feedback, investors buy
(sell) the risky asset if its return over the last trading interval was posi-
tive (negative). Such trend-following amplifies price fluctuations in either
direction and can become self-reinforcing in models with boundedly rational
traders and short horizons; see Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2005).
1Such headline episodes include the 1987 stock market crash, the collapse of the U.S.
dollar against the yen on October 7, 1998, distressed trading in certain fixed income
markets during the LTCM crisis in the summer of 1998, and the recent liquidity crisis
driven by the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market in August 2007.
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Second, following risk feedback, investors sell more (less) of the risky asset
if its squared return in the last trading interval was high (low). Risk feedback
trading always induces net selling pressure, and its absolute contribution to
net orderflow rises (declines) during volatile (tranquil) periods. The infor-
mation content of a larger absolute (square) return is that mean reversion to
fundamentals-based price level–however defined–becomes more likely. In
the presence of fundamental information, this may reflect Black’s (1986) hy-
pothesis that “the farther the price of a stock is from its [fundamental] value,
the more aggressive the information traders become”. In a continuous-time
framework, Longstaﬀ (2001) also shows that liquidity-constrained investors
may optimally short-sell the asset if volatility is large enough.
In the absence of fundamental news, risk feedback is motivated by the
observation that bad periods (negative returns) also tend to be more volatile.
Risk feedback trading then amplifies net selling pressure and increases intra-
day returns persistence. Evidence to that eﬀect has been found for the U.S.
Treasury bond market by Cohen and Shin (2003). These authors report the
presence of positive feedback in tick-by-tick trading on February 3, 2000, a
particularly stressful day in the U.S. Treasury market: price declines (rises)
elicit sales (purchases) at short horizons. Importantly, they also find positive
feedback tends to be stronger when the market is under stress. To the extent
that volatile market conditions tend to coincide with negative performance,
the sales pressure on price will be growing in last period’s volatility. The
resulting conditional trading pattern can then be attributed to risk feedback.
Positive feedback trading is related to “momentum” strategies and herd-
ing behavior, while the sign asymmetry involved in risk feedback trading
contributes to stabilize the market during an upswing–possibly extending
the life of an asset price bubble–and to destabilize it during a downswing.
Cohen and Shin (2003) argue that both short-term feedback types are more
likely to arise in “pressurized” high-frequency environments where traders
are subject to stop-loss constraints, such as those modeled by Morris and
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Shin (2004). Both feedback rules are more relevant at high-frequency when
there is no news about fundamentals. Indeed, Hwang and Salmon (2004)
report that herding behavior is independent of fundamentals also at daily
frequency.2
The paper’s approach follows the microstructure literature investigating
the presence of temporary but persistent imbalances between asset demand
and supply at the transaction level. On the empirical side, Brandt and Kava-
jecz (2004) report that orderflow imbalances in the U.S. Treasury market can
account for over 25 percent of the daily yield variation on days without ma-
jor news, while Furfine and Remolona (2005) find that the market regains its
composure quickly after experiencing discontinuous price changes.3
Feedback trading models with temporary orderflow disequilibrium start
with Beja and Goldman (1980). These authors employ a linear pricing rule
aggregating the demands of positive feedback traders (chartists, or directional
traders) and information traders (fundamentalists, or value investors). The
latter trade on subjective assessments of price in relation to value and their
expectation formation matters for equilibrium behavior. A key finding then
is that the equilibrium price can become unstable if the proportion of positive
feedback traders is suﬃciently large. More recently, Day and Huang (1990)
introduce a market maker and find that price behavior can be chaotic if the
price impact coeﬃcient becomes too large. Using a nonlinear pricing rule,
Chiarella (1992) shows that the price level reverts to a limit cycle following
a shock away from equilibrium, and dynamic instability becomes more likely
as feedback traders’ horizons become shorter.4
2The asymmetry inherent in risk feedback is consistent with experimental evidence
suggesting that economic agents are asymmetrically loss averse (Duxbury and Summers
(2004)) and exhibit both herding and contrarian behavior in simulated trading conditions
(Cipriani and Guarino (2005) and Drehmann et al. (2005)).
3On the price impact of order imbalances in other markets see Andersen et al. (2004),
Chakravarty (2001) and Evans and Lyons (2002).
4Farmer and Joshi (2002) and Wieland and Westerhoﬀ (2005) extend the Day and
Huang framework with stochastic information and dynamic noise. Hommes (2006) and
LeBaron (2006) survey agent-based models of feedback trading. For behavioral explana-
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Liquidity is defined as market depth, which is inversely related to the
price impact of trades (Kyle (1985)). High-frequency evidence suggests that
market liquidity is time-varying, especially in stressful periods; see Dufour
and Engle (2000), Farmer et al. (2005), and Goldreich et al. (2005). In
view of this stylized fact, I assume that the price impact coeﬃcient mapping
net orderflow to prices follows a stationary AR(1) process characterized by
a certain persistence and noise.
At the start of each trading period, a risk-neutral market maker receives
the net orderflow and raises (lowers) the asset price if excess asset demand
is positive (negative). The returns process generated by the combination
of market participants’ orderflow–assumed to be driven only by the most
recent price fluctuation–and the market maker’s linear price adjustment is
shown to follow a logistic (quadratic) first-order diﬀerence equation. The
logistic mapping has two fixed points, one of which is always zero while the
other is generically nonzero.5 Fixed point stability then becomes a function
of price impact and feedback intensity. In this paper I consider the latter to
be exogenously fixed and focus attention on time-varying liquidity.
The main results are as follows. First, as price impact grows and market
liquidity declines, the dynamics progressively go through the following non-
overlapping “states of the market”: (i) stable, or tranquil markets, when the
zero fixed point is stable and feedback trading does not aﬀect asset returns;
(ii) market stress, when the nonzero fixed point is unstable; and (iii) market
turbulence, in which both fixed points are unstable. Beyond the turbulence
range, the dynamics become chaotic and trading may be suspended. Hence,
financial instability can be simply defined as the relative likelihood of market
states (ii)-(iii), when feedback trading impacts upon asset returns, against
the likelihood of tranquil state (i).
tions of herding behavior, including short-termism, see De Bondt and Thaler (1995).
5The logistic’s potential for complex dynamics was realized by May (1973) and ini-
tially applied to evolutionary growth models, with positive feedback corresponding to the
reproduction tendency and risk feedback to the inhibiting factor in a population.
4
Second, the magnitude of the price impact thresholds separating the three
states is independent of risk feedback intensity and smoothly decreasing in
positive feedback intensity. Therefore, the latter is potentially destabilizing.
However, given any positive feedback, volatile market-making activity–in
the sense of strong price impact persistence and noise–may always result
in the return dynamics entering the stress state. A key implication, then, is
that although low momentum is necessary for financial stability (state (i)),
it is not suﬃcient because states (ii)-(iii) can always arise from extreme price
impact realizations.
Third, the return dynamics are reversible: stochastic price impact may,
in principle, cross a threshold from either direction and re-enter the relevant
market state. Episodes of market stress and turbulence can thus be said to
be intermittent, after Mandelbrot’s (1974) original use of the term in fluid
mechanics.6 Intermittence amounts to “[...] the presence of irregular bursts
in time series of a wide variety of volatility estimators” (Cont (2001)). I also
find that as the market becomes stressed and turbulent, the distributions
of returns and absolute return autocorrelations display power-law features
(‘Pareto tails’), and these become stronger as liquidity dries up.
The paper is related to the continuous-time framework of Bouchaud and
Cont (1998). These authors posit behavioral-based trading rules–excess as-
set demand increases in positive feedback and decreases in returns volatility
and loss aversion–and show that low and stable price impact can absorb
big order imbalances with very small price changes. They also analyze the
likelihood of a market crash as a function of the strength of feedback trading
and liquidity conditions. I complement their approach by explicitly modeling
time-varying price impact on a discrete time-scale, and by studying market
dynamics in the absence of fundamental information other than that con-
6The potential unpredictability of a time series in the absence of shocks is central
to the endogenous economic fluctuations literature; see Boldrin and Woodford (1990).
Scheinkman and LeBaron (1989) presented evidence that U.S. stock returns may display
chaotic behavior.
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tained in prices themselves, i.e. assuming “pure feedback” akin to program
trading at high-frequency.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 presents the feedback trading
model, derives its steady states and classifies their stability; Section 3 obtains
a correpondence between fixed point stability and the underlying state of the
market; Section 4 illustrates the dynamic transition between states numer-
ically, and estimates power-law exponents for returns and absolute return
autocorrelations for diﬀerent states; Section 6 discusses some implications of
intermittence; and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Net order flow
Consider a single risky asset traded intraday, and denote its actual return
at time t by xt = x(t,∆t) = logP (t +∆t)− logP (t), where P (t) is the log
price level at t. High-frequency applications often discretize the time between
actual trades to ∆t = 5min. For my purposes the frequency should be high
enough so that fundamentals do not enter into consideration.
Asset demand is deterministically driven by the two short-term feedback
trading rules discussed in Section 1. Under positive feedback, investors buy
(sell) the asset at time t if they observe positive (negative) returns at t− 1.
Positive feedback generates orderflow ω+t = γ+xt−1 6= 0, where γ+ > 0 is
a scalar mapping returns at t − 1 to asset units demanded at t. The case
γ+ < 0, reflecting contrarian (buy low-sell high) strategies is excluded for
analytical tractability.
Contrarian behavior is eﬀectively captured by risk feedback trading: in-
vestors sell more (less) of the risky asset at t if they observe higher (lower)
squared realized returns at t− 1. Considering x2t−1 to be a volatility proxy,
short-term contrarian traders employing some market equilibrium model will
respond to higher x2t−1 and the associated positive expected returns for pe-
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riod t by selling the asset, as they expect excess returns to mean-revert. This
is related to Campbell and Hentschel’s (1992) volatility-feedback hypothesis;
after a bad and volatile period, such traders amplify the down movement
while after a good (but less volatile) period they mitigate the up movement,
so that “no news is good news”.7
The orderflow component from risk feedback is ω−t = −γ−x2t−1 < 0,
where scalar γ− > 0 maps squared returns at t − 1 to asset units sold at t.
In principle, γ+ 6= γ− and the intensity of each feedback type is expected to
be time-varying. The net orderflow (signed trade volume) received by the
market maker at time t then is
ωt = ω+t + ω
−
t
= γ+xt−1 − γ−x2t−1 (1)
Given γ+ and γ−, the sign of ωt depends on the realized return and its
square over the last trading interval. Negative return shocks at t− 1 have a
larger absolute impact on orderflow at t than symmetric positive shocks. As
argued above, higher orderflow following a positive shock will be dampened
as risk feedback cancels some of the associated momentum. This asymmetric
contribution of risk feedback to asset demand is consistent with Longstaﬀ’s
(2001) continuous-time asset pricing framework and the liquidity black hole
model of Morris and Shin (2004), both assuming liquidity-constrained in-
vestors facing short-term trading limits.
2.2 Stochastic price impact
Assuming a risk-neutral market maker, so the price change depends only
on the most recent orderflow and not on accumulated inventory, Farmer and
Joshi (2002) derive a linear price adjustment mechanism as an approximation
7Campbell and Hentschel (1992) use a quadratic function of a GARCH(1,1) and find
strong evidence of volatility feedback on stock market data; see also Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay (1997).
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of a general price impact function. Upon receiving ωt a single market maker
adjusts prices from t− 1 to t using the linear pricing rule
xt = λt ωt = λtγ+xt−1 − λtγ−x2t−1 (2)
Equation (2) is consistent with order- rather than quote-driven markets. Co-
eﬃcient λt > 0 measures the price impact of a unit change in net orderflow.
Price impact is always positive and inversely related to market liquidity, and
the sign of xt changes with the aggregate volume imbalance. It is positive
(negative) when there is net buying (selling) pressure. Further, following a
negative return at t− 1, net selling pressure has a greater absolute eﬀect on
returns at t than equal buying pressure because, given λt > 0, risk feedback
reinforces the negative trend.
The price impact coeﬃcient is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
λt = λ+ θλt−1 + ηt , ηt ∼ iid(0, ση) (3)
where the price impact innovations ηt are assumed to be iid. The constant
term λ > 0 is inversely related to average (intraday) market liquidity. Autore-
gressive representation (3) is similar to that used by Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) for the time-varying cost of illiquidity.8
The dynamics of price impact are driven by λ, θ, and the distribution
of the innovation terms η. The properties of {λt} are straightforward: it
is covariance-stationary iﬀ | θ |< 1 and nonstationary otherwise; its un-
conditional mean and variance are λ/1 − θ and σ2η/1 − θ2, respectively; its
conditional mean and variance are λ + θλt−1 and σ2η; and its persistence at
lag k equals the relevant autocorrelation coeﬃcient, ρ(k) = θk.
8Esser and Mönch (2002) and Frey (2000) also model illiquidity as a mean-reverting
state variable in continuous time. However, Bouchaud et al. (2004) and Upper and Werner
(2002, 2007) find that the process of high-frequency price discovery displays breaks and is
likely to be much more complex.
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2.3 Fixed point existence and stability
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) yields
xt = h(xt−1) = λtxt−1γ+
∙
1− γ
−
γ+
xt−1
¸
(4)
Equation (4) is a quadratic (logistic) first-order diﬀerence equation de-
scribing the nonlinear relationship between returns in adjacent time intervals.
In principle, the resulting dynamics are independent of the time scale∆t used
to discretize returns.
The implied covariance between successive return observations then is
E(xtxt−1) = γ+E(λtx2t−1)− γ−E(λtx3t−1) (5)
Equation (5) clearly suggests that skewness matters for returns persis-
tence; ceteris paribus, short-term persistence grows in the asymmetry cap-
tured by risk feedback trading intensity γ−. Section 4.3 discusses the impli-
cations of this property for high-frequency return autocorrelations.
The fixed points of logistic map h are defined as x ≡ h(xt−1) = xt.
They are the equilibrium steady states of the underlying one-dimensional
dynamical system; thus if asset returns equal x they will remain there unless
perturbed. Specifically, the two fixed points are
x(1)t = 0 , x
(2)
t =
1
γ−
µ
γ+ − 1
λt
¶
6= 0 (6)
Note that x(1)t is always zero, hence I omit its time subscript, while x
(2)
t is
nonzero unless λt = 1/γ+.9 For given positive γ+ and γ−, fixed point x
(2)
t is
positive when λt > 1/γ+ and negative if λt < 1/γ+. In the first case, x
(2)
t > 0
increases in positive feedback intensity and price impact and decreases in risk
feedback intensity. In the second case (x(2)t < 0), the nonzero fixed point is
absolutely decreasing in γ+, γ− and in price impact.
9The two fixed points coincide when λt = 1/γ+. If price impact is continuously dis-
tributed then λt = 1/γ+ has zero measure, so x
(2)
t is generically nonzero.
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The evolution of asset returns turns on the two fixed points’ relative
stability. A fixed point is stable (unstable) if the absolute value of the slope
of (4) at that fixed point is smaller (greater) than one. The slope of h with
respect to x is h0(x) = λtγ+(1 − 2γ
−
γ+ x). The absolute value of h
0(·) at x(1)
and x(2)t then is
| h0(x(1)) |=| λtγ+ | (7)
| h0(x(2)t ) |=| 2− λtγ+ |
At most one fixed point can be stable at any time. Equations (7) then
imply, first, that if 0 < λt < 1/γ+ then x(1) = 0 is stable, while x
(2)
t < 0 is
unstable. Second, if 1/γ+ < λt < 3/γ+ then x
(2)
t > 0 is stable and x(1) = 0
is unstable. In that case, the magnitude of the stable positive fixed point
grows with price impact, as ∂x
(2)
t
∂λt
= 1γ−λ2t
> 0, and its sensitivity to λt declines
with risk feedback intensity γ−. Third, if λt > 3/γ+ then h0(·) always exceeds
one. Both fixed points are then unstable and the dynamics become turbulent.
Finally, if λt > 4/γ+, the logistic map can be shown to display sensitivity
to initial conditions, there are periodic points of all orders and the dynamics
become chaotic.
3 Intermittent financial (in)stability
3.1 Correspondence with market conditions
The above fixed point classification indicates that asset returs in each trading
interval lie in one of three possible dynamic states, depending on the strength
of positive feedback γ+ and the determinants of price impact λ, θ and ση. I
introduce the following correspondence between fixed point stability and the
“state of the market” at each point in time:
(i) Tranquil markets, corresponding to 0 < λt ≤ 1/γ+. For such values,
the nonzero fixed point is always negative and unstable. Consequently, the
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presence of feedback trading does not displace asset returns from zero, their
equilibrium level in the absence of fundamental news.
(ii) Market stress, corresponding to 1/γ+ < λt ≤ 3/γ+. The nonzero
fixed point is now positive and stable, hence feedback trading impacts upon
asset returns.
(iii) Market turbulence, where feedback trading generates unstable return
dynamics (3/γ+ < λt < 4/γ+).
The price impact threshold separating tranquil markets from market
stress is 1/γ+, while that between market stress and turbulence is 3/γ+.
Note that each threshold is monotonically decreasing in the intensity of pos-
itive feedback but independent of risk feedback. Stronger momentum thus
makes financial instability more likely, other things equal.
For price impact values beyond λt = 4/γ+, the logistic map generates de-
terministic chaos; see Devaney (1989) and Holmgren (1997). Returns diverge
and the corresponding state of the market has measure zero.
3.2 Simulation design
In this paper I restrict γ+ and γ− to 1 for illustration purposes; time-
varying feedback intensities are discussed in Section 7. The subsequent
simulations investigate the transition between states (i)-(iii) for Gaussian
price impact innovations {ηt}.10 The returns time series {xt} is initialized at
x0 = γ+/2γ− = 0.5, the logistic’s unique critical point.11 In turn, the price
impact process is initialized at its unconditional mean: λ1 = λ/1− θ where
λ = 0.5. Feeding the starting values x0 and λ0 to logistic map (4) yields
x1, the return in the next trading interval. The price impact coeﬃcient for
t = 1, λ1 is then computed from equation (3), the values of x1 and λ1 are fed
10Using the uniform and other non-Gaussian shock pdf’s did not aﬀect the essence of
the results; these are available upon request.
11The choice of x0 is justified by Fatou’s Theorem: if the trajectories of a quadratic
polynomial have an attracting periodic point, then its critical point(s) are in the stable
set of one of the points in each trajectory.
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to equation (4) to determine x2, etc. In this way, positive and risk feedback
trading generate t = 1, ..., T observations for {xt}, each characterized by a
diﬀerent price impact realization {λt}.
I present t = 1, ..., T = 500 price impact and return realizations for states
(i), (ii) and (iii). The choice of T reflects high-frequency trading in the
U.S. Treasury market. Daily trading in U.S. Treasuries takes place between
7:00am and 5:00pm. Assuming, without loss of generality, that each minute
in the 8-hour period contains a single trade yields 480 trading intervals.12
The simulated asset returns can thus be viewed as snapshots of a trading
day in a particular state of the market.
In order to assess the characteristics of the pdf’s, the above 1-day process
is run n = 1, ..., N = 1, 000 times, yielding over 3 years of simulated high-
frequency data. For each state, I report the simulated pdf’s first four mo-
ments averaged over allN 1-day paths. Following standard practice in nonlin-
ear dynamic simulations, the first 200 iterated returns of each path ({xt}200t=1)
are discarded to ensure convergence has occured. The simulated moments
are then computed from the remaining ({xT=500t=201 }Nn=1) iterations.
4 Numerical simulations
4.1 Tranquil markets: 0 < λtγ+ ≤ 1
When markets are tranquil (0 < λt ≤ 1) feedback trading does not aﬀect
price dynamics. To illustrate, I set the persistence of price impact to θ = 0.2,
and assume that price impact innovations are iid distributed ηt ∼ N(0, 0.05).
Price impact is initialized at its unconditional mean, λ1 = λ/1− θ = 0.625.
Fig. 1 below shows the simulated {λt} and {xt} series
FIGURE 1 HERE
12Fleming (2001) describes the microstructure of the U.S. Treasury market.
12
All price impact realizations are less than one, so the dynamics is in the
stable range of x(1) = 0.
The simulated returns’ risk-adjusted mean (sample mean/standard devi-
ation), skewness and kurtosis averaged over all N = 1, 000 distributions, i.e.
{xT=500t=201 }Nn=1, are reported in Table 1
Table 1: Tranquil markets
Simulated return pdf’s
μ/s 0.000
Skewness 8.82
Kurtosis 87
Risk-adjusted expected returns are zero up to 8 decimal places. The simu-
lated returns pdf is very skewed and fat-tailed. Excess kurtosis is broadly
consistent with the high-frequency evidence: for example, Cont (2001) re-
ports values of 15.95 for S&P 500, 74 for US$/DM, and 60 for returns on
USD/SF exchange rate futures.
Next, I use bifurcation diagrams to assess the evolution of fixed point
stability in the price impact domain. Initializing λ1 = 0.625, i = 1, ..., 400
price impact realizations {λi} are drawn from equation (3). For each λi, an
asset return trajectory is initialized at xi0 = 0.5 as above. Each trajectory
then consists of t = 1, ..., 300 iterations of logistic map (4): (λi, hi(0.5)300t=1).
The resulting behavior of return trajectories in tranquil market conditions is
shown in the bifurcation diagram below
FIGURE 2 HERE
The key feature of Fig. 2 is that, at each choice of λi (i = 1, ...100), the
feedback return trajectories xit (t = 1, ..., 300) become dense towards zero.
Price impact ranges from 0.45 to around 0.75, hence h is firmly in the stable
range of x(1) = 0 (x(2)t 6= 0). Note that some simulated trajectories correspond
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to positive returns. However, they are unstable because feedback trading–
continued iteration of {xit} given i–attracts them back to zero. Also note
that as price impact increases (liquidity declines), the unstable trajectories
slope upwards and the dynamics edge towards the stress threshold.
4.2 Market stress: 1 < λtγ+ ≤ 3
In the range 1 < λt ≤ 3, the zero fixed point x(1) becomes unstable (repelling)
and x(2)t > 0 is stable (attracting). Asset returns generated by feedback
trading then induce market stress: state (ii) in Section 3.1. Clearly, in order
for some price impact realizations to break into the stress range, {λt} has to
become more persistent and/or noisy. To illustrate such dynamics, I increase
the AR(1) coeﬃcient to θ = 0.5 and double the standard deviation of liquidity
shocks, so that ηt ∼ N(0, 0.10). The price impact coeﬃcient is now initialized
at λ1 = λ/1− θ = 1. The simulated {λt} and {xt} series are shown in Fig. 3
FIGURE 3 HERE
The market stress threshold is indicated with a horizontal line at λ = 1 in
the bottom panel. Price impact is less than the threshold 45.2 percent of
time (300 trading periods averaged over 1, 000 1-day paths), and above it the
remaining 54.8 percent. In the top panel, positive fixed point x(2)t attracts
neighboring points towards it and away from x(1) = 0. Asset returns are still
close to zero (note the 10−8 scale on the vertical axis) but much more volatile
than in state (i).
The risk-adjusted mean, skewness and kurtosis averaged over {xT=500t=201 }Nn=1
simulated return distributions are reported in Table 2
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Table 2: Market stress
Simulated return pdf’s
μ/s 0.0011
Skewness 1.52
Kurtosis 5.21
Risk-adjusted expected returns are now positive, reflecting the fact that
x(2)t > 0 when λt ∈ (1, 3]. There is much less right-skewness and leptokurtosis
than in the tranquil state.
Beyond λ = 1, x(2)t switches from being unstable to stable. This discon-
tinuous dynamic transition is shown in the bifurcation diagram below
FIGURE 4 HERE
The price impact coeﬃcient now ranges from 0.75 to 1.30. As in tranquil
state (i), the return trajectories become more dense towards zero at each λi
realization. Unlike state (i), however, as {λi} exceeds 1 the return trajectories
slope upwards because steady-state returns have turned positive.
4.3 Market turbulence: 3 < λtγ+ < 4
Asset returns enter state (iii), market turbulence, if both fixed points become
unstable, which occurs when | h0(·) |> 1. In turn, that requires price impact
to be in the range λt > 3. To illustrate, I maintain λ = 0.5 and ηt ∼
N(0, 0.10) but raise the AR(1) coeﬃcient to θ = 0.85, so λ1 = λ/1−θ = 3.33.
The simulated {λt} and {xt} series are shown in Fig. 5
FIGURE 5 HERE
Only 0.4 percent of price impact realizations now falls in the tranquil state
0 < λt ≤ 1 (bottom panel). 6.8 percent is in the stress state 1 < λt ≤ 3,
and the remaining 92.8 percent is in the turbulent range 3 < λt < 4. There
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are no outcomes in the chaotic range λt ≥ 4, and there is very pronounced
volatility clustering (top panel).
Table 3 reports the risk-adjusted mean, skewness and kurtosis averaged
over all {xT=500t=201 }Nn=1 return distributions
Table 3: Market Turbulence
Simulated return pdf’s
μ/s 0.0064
Skewness −0.258
Kurtosis 1.837
Risk-adjusted returns are now very high; moreover, the simulated xt dis-
tributions have become left-skewed and there is negative excess kurtosis.
Left-skewness is particularly interesting because it relates to short-horizon
returns persistence. From equation (5) recall that, given γ−, the first-order
(adjacent ticks) autocorrelation decreases in the skewness of returns. There-
fore, the switch of skewness from positive to negative along the transition
from tranquil markets to turbulence (via market stress) suggests that re-
turns persistence progressively increases as market liquidity “dries up”. This
property appears consistent with Cohen and Shin’s (2003) evidence for the
U.S. Treasury market.
The bifurcation diagram for state (iii) is in Fig. 6
FIGURE 6 HERE
Note that the dynamics begin to change very rapidly beyond the turbu-
lence threshold. In the range 3 < λt ≤ 3.45 there are period-doubling bi-
furcations. From λ ' 3.33, the return trajectories display a period-doubling
bifurcation “cascade” familiar from chaotic dynamics. Specifically, every
period-2 attracting orbit divides into an attracting period-4 trajectory and
a repelling period-2 trajectory. Another period-doubling bifurcation occurs
16
when λi is near 3.5: period-4 trajectories then split into period-8 and period-
16 trajectories, and so on. For λ > 3.6 it can be shown that there are
periodic points of all orders if a period-3 periodic point exists. Finally, be-
yond λi = 4, the iterated return orbits can be shown to be period-k for all
k > 0 and deterministic chaos emerges.
5 Power-law properties of returns
This Section investigates whether the asset returns generated by these dy-
namics are power-law distributed. I adopt the following nonparametric esti-
mator of α, the power-law distribution’s exponent for an empirical distribu-
tion consisting of {xTt=1}N=1,000n=1 return vectors, where each vector corresponds
to a day consisting of T = 500 trading periods (ticks)13
bαn = 1 + T " TX
t=1
log
µ
xtn
xnmin
¶#−1
(8)
where xnmin is the minimum obervation in returns vector n that could be
consistent with a power-law distribution. The power-law exponent estimator
in (8) is always greater than 1, implying that all moments m ≥ bαn + 1
will diverge. Note that the summation terms are well-defined in the market
stress and turbulence states, where the negative fixed point is unstable, but
not in the tranquil state where returns can be negative. This α-estimator
has the advantage of being less biased than regression methods, also in small
samples, and is equivalent to the Hill estimator; see Hall (1982) and Newman
(2005). However, it need not give the right estimate if the true dgp is not
Pareto-type.
I use the same θ and σ values for each dynamic state as in Section 4,
motivated by the U.S. Treasury market’s microstructure. Averaging bαn over
n = 1, ..., N = 1, 000 1-day paths for each parameter combination, the mean
13The power-law exponent is α, where the Pareto-tail probability of returns x is pro-
portional to Pα(x) ∼ A
α
|x|1+α for x→ ±∞.
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value of the power-law exponent is bα = ³PNn=1 bαn´ /N . The bα values for
each state are reported in Table 4
Table 4: Power-law exponents of returns14
Market state (θ, σ) bα
Tranquil 1.01
Stress 1.43
Turbulence 2.54
The estimates suggest that returns are power-law distributed in all 3
states. Indeed, the exponent is closest to one in the tranquil and stress states,
suggesting that all the corresponding moments diverge. However, this finding
should be treated with caution because the minimum return realizations xnmin
are arbitrarily close to zero in each of the N paths, and particularly in state
(i). This tends to lower all bαn estimates and their average.15 By contrast, the
2.54 exponent estimate for state (iii) is close to the lower end of the 2—5 range
reported by Bouchaud and Cont (2001), indicating that skewness, kurtosis
and higher moments will likely diverge during turbulence.
I now turn to assess the persistence properties of returns. The auto-
correlation coeﬃcients of absolute return powers at lag τ are defined as
ρ(t, τ) = corr[| xt |δ, | xt−τ |δ]. As there is suﬃcient consensus that au-
tocorrelations decay slowest when δ = 1, i.e. absolute returns, I report on
that case only; see Bouchaud and Cont (2001). The absolute return autocor-
relograms for τ = 1, ..., 100 lags (ticks corresponding to 5min) during market
stress and turbulence are respectively shown in Figs. 7 and 816
FIGURES 7 AND 8 HERE
14The (θ, σ) parameter values for each state are as before. The empirical histograms ofbαn are available upon request.
15Another reason why α estimates in state (i) are unreliable is that excluding negative
(tranquil) return observations reduces the eﬀective sample size.
16For consistency with Fig. 3 above, Fig. 7 shows three autocorrelation paths. .
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In both cases, the decay patterns of ρ (t, τ) clearly suggest the presence
of long memory. During stress (Fig. 7) this appears to be declining smoothly
and is more pronounced than the corresponding squared-returns autocorrel-
ogram in Bouchaud and Cont (2001) for the same maximum lag number.
During market turbulence (Fig. 8), persistence is even stronger but unex-
ploitable because of the rapidly alternating signs.
The negative autocorrelations present a computational problem, in that
the resulting power-law exponents estimated from equation (8) are complex-
valued. I circumvent this by using the absolute value of the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient at all lags in the estimation; as persistence is symmetrical, this
transformation does not aﬀect its properties. Fig. 9 below reports the empir-
ical histograms of α-exponents in states (ii) and (iii), respectively computed
from N = 1, 000 daily return paths
FIGURE 9 HERE
The wide range of α-exponents of absolute-return autocorrelation reflects
the rapid oscillation of returns, particularly during turbulence. For example,
the exponent for the particular autocorrelation pattern shown in Fig. 8 was
1.80. The first four moments of the power-law exponents included in the
empirical histograms of Fig. 9 are reported below
Table 5: Absolute return autocorrelations
Power-law exponent descriptive statistics
Market state Stress Turbulence
mean 3.17 3.04
s.d. 2.39 2.88
skewness 2.26 3.44
kurtosis 10.85 18.14
Table 5 indicates that the mean α-exponent of absolute return autocor-
relations is about 3 in both states, indicating that only kurtosis is undefined.
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Both distributions are significantly right-skewed and fat-tailed, and more so
for market turbulence. The tentative conclusion from the simulation evidence
is that the persistence of absolute returns displays power-law features.
6 Discussion
The numerical simulations in Section 4 suggest a positive relationship be-
tween the values of θ and σ and the likelihood of a dynamic transition from
tranquil to turbulent markets. Smaller price impact (greater liquidity) im-
proves the zero fixed point’s stability, while bigger price impact tends to
destabilize it, all else equal. In other words, stable market-making is critical
for maintaining financial stability. Given any intensity of feedback trading,
liquidity should be suﬃciently high and stable at each point in time–in the
sense of weak persistence and small variance of price impact–to guarantee
the tranquil market state.
However, the transition between two dynamic states can go in both di-
rections. Turbulence is thus reversible, or intermittent in the sense of Man-
delbrot (1974), related also to Giardina and Bouchaud (2003) and Heagy
et al. (1994). To quote Shin (2004, p.150), “occasionally, financial markets
experience episodes of turbulence of such an extreme kind that they appear
to stop functioning”. Accordingly, one interpretation of the high-frequency
evidence oﬀered by Morris and Shin (2004) is that active markets can un-
dergo mini-liquidity gaps several times in a day. Intermittent turbulence is
also consistent with Plantin et al. (2004), who find less liquid asset markets
are more vulnerable to episodes of turbulence. In the same vein, Danielsson
and Payne (2001) find intermittent “liquidity gaps” in electronic limit order
book-based FX trading.
The framework also serves to illustrate the asymmetric eﬀects of net or-
derflow on prices. On one hand, excess buying pressure through positive
feedback is always mitigated by risk feedback. On the other hand, risk feed-
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back acts to amplify excess selling pressure. This asymmetry is in line with
evidence of relatively long periods of asset price rises–Alan Greenspan’s
irrational exuberance–followed by very steep price declines; Shiller (2005)
considers such patterns to be asset price bubbles. The simplifying assump-
tion that positive and risk feedback operate only on the last period’s returns
seems consistent with accounts of short-termism in financial markets. Trichet
(2005) outlines alternative rationales for market participants’ preoccupation
with short-term results; these range frommarking-to-market and benchmark-
ing of performance against competitors, to the spread of index management
and VaR considerations.
Finally, note that purely deterministic feedback trading cannot generate
a collapsing asset price, because x(2)t < 0 is unstable for all 0 < λtγ+ < 1.
Thus, the dynamics generated by logistic map (4) can only sustain zero or
positive asset returns. Allowing for the possibility of falling price levels and
negative returns requires introducing a noise term ξt ∼ iid(0, σξ) aﬀecting
returns in period t. Such noise can be thought of as a stationary pricing error
measuring the quality of the market microstructure; see Hasbrouck (1993).
A noisy version of equation (4) would be
xt+1 = λtxt−1γ+
∙
1− γ
−
γ+
xt−1
¸
+ ξt (9)
Simulating returns using stochastic first-order diﬀerence equation (9) is
necessary for asset price bubbles to eventually burst. A straightforward nu-
merical application of the noisy logistic map thus involves generating bubble
paths for diﬀerent parameterizations of λt (θ and ση), γ+, γ− and σξ.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper I investigated the potential for financial (in)stability and tur-
bulence arising from high-frequency feedback trading in the absence of fun-
damental information. A logistic interaction of feedback portfolio strategies
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generated stable (tranquil), unstable (stressful) or turbulent return dynam-
ics depending on stochastic market liquidity and fixed feedback trading in-
tensity. The dynamics were driven by price adjustment to short-term or-
derflow imbalances according to the combined strength of positive feedback
trading–reflecting momentum strategies–and risk feedback trading, driven
by liquidity-constrained investors’ volatility-dependent strategies. I obtained
a well-defined correspondence between the range of stochastic price impact
and the likelihood of each dynamic state. Importantly, price impact can
cross the thresholds separating the dynamic states in both directions, so the
occurence of market turbulence is intermittent in Mandelbrot’s sense.
The numerical calibration was motivated by high-frequency trading in the
U.S. Treasury market and its microstructure. Empirically, the contrarian-
based (volatility feedback) interpretation of risk feedback in Section 2 may
oﬀer a useful avenue for estimating feedback intensities by fitting diﬀerence
equation (2) to lower-frequency data. However, for such applications feed-
back trading would have to be integrated within a market-clearing model.
Analytically, the dynamics was kept tractable by fixing the intensities of
both trading rules and limiting feedback to the last trading interval. In that
regard, two important extensions involve allowing stochastic price impact
to depend on the market’s realized volatility, and introducing time-varying
feedback intensities in response to the fluctuating heterogeneity of market
opinion. Overall, the framework serves to underline the key role of sto-
chastic price impact in driving high-frequency market dynamics, as well as
influencing the long-memory properties of returns and their persistence.
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